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Abstract. In a prior study (Garrett, 2011), I introduced a simple economic growth model designed
to be consistent with general thermodynamic laws. Unlike traditional economic models, civilization
is viewed only as a well-mixed global whole with no distinction made between individual nations,
economic sectors, labor, or capital investments. At the model core is a hypothesis that the global
economy’s current rate of primary energy consumption is tied through a constant to a very general5
representation of its historically accumulated wealth. Observations support this hypothesis, and
indicate that the constant’s value is λ= 9.7± 0.3 milliwatts per 1990 US dollar. It is this link that
allows for treatment of seemingly complex economic systems as simple physical systems. Here, this
growth model is coupled to a linear formulation for the evolution of globally well-mixed atmospheric
CO2 concentrations. While very simple, the coupled model provides faithful multi-decadal hindcasts10
of trajectories in gross world product (GWP) and CO2. Extending the model to the future, the model
suggests that the well-known IPCC SRES scenarios substantially underestimate how much CO2
levels will rise for a given level of future economic prosperity. For one, global CO2 emission rates
cannot be decoupled from wealth through efficiency gains. For another, like a long-term natural
disaster, future greenhouse warming can be expected to act as an inflationary drag on the real growth15
of global wealth. For atmospheric CO2 concentrations to remain below a “dangerous” level of
450 ppmv (Hansen et al., 2007), model forecasts suggest that there will have to be some combination
of an unrealistically rapid rate of energy decarbonization and nearly immediate reductions in global
civilization wealth. Effectively, it appears that civilization may be in a double-bind. If civilization
does not collapse quickly this century, then CO2 levels will likely end up exceeding 1000 ppmv; but,20
if CO2 levels rise by this much, then the risk is that civilization will gradually tend towards collapse.
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1 Introduction
Despite decades of public awareness of the potential for fossil fuel consumption to lead to dangerous
climate change, anthropogenic emissions of CO2 have accelerated (Canadell et al., 2007; Raupach
et al., 2007). The implications of civilization continuing on this path are environmental changes that25
are both irreversible and profound, including amplified hydrological extremes, storm intensification,
sea level rise, and extreme mammalian heat stress (Hansen et al., 2007; Allan and Soden, 2008;
Solomon et al., 2009; Vermeer and Rahmstorf, 2009; Sherwood and Huber, 2010).
The economic costs associated with addressing and coping with climate warming are normally
quantified by coupling a system of economic equations to a medium complexity climate model.30
Normally, these Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) make regionally-based assessments of the
economics of production, investment, consumption, welfare, discount rates, population and rates of
technological change. These economic functions are coupled to functions for atmospheric temper-
ature and climate damage. From within a parameter space that might be of order 100 variables,
the model outcome is a long-term optimized trajectory for long-term societal welfare to which pol-35
icy measures (for example the Copenhagen Accord) can be compared (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000;
Keller et al., 2004; Nordhaus, 2010). Uncertainty in the optimal path, when addressed, is mod-
eled using Monte Carlo simulations within a portion of the total parameter space (Mastrandrea and
Schneider, 2004).
Modern IAMs are normally based on mainstream neo-classical economic growth models that,40
unlike climate models, do not explicitly represent flows as a material flux down pressure gradients.
Economic flows are allowed to become progressively decoupled from energy consumption and CO2
emissions through gains in energy efficiency. Several of the widely used IPCC SRES scenarios even
go so far as to allow economic growth to continue while CO2 emissions stabilize or decline (Raupach
et al., 2007).45
This “have our cake and eat it too” viewpoint has been disputed by many ecological economists.
The argument against decoupling is that consumption of energy is thermodynamically required for
any system to evolve, and there is no physical reason that the human system should be treated as an
exception (Lotka, 1922; Georgescu-Roegen, 1993; Ayres et al., 2003). Some have even suggested
that policies aimed at improving energy efficiency might backfire through what is known as “Jevons’50
Paradox”: energy is useful, and for a given level of resource availability, efficiency gains make it
cheaper and more desirable, ultimately leading to greater rates of energy consumption and CO2
emissions (Saunders, 2000; Alcott, 2005; Owen, 2010; Alcott, 2010).
This article continues in a similar conceptual vein, but it differs by treating the human system
in a more strictly physical fashion. Here, no internal resolution is made of political divisions or55
economic sectors. Rather, civilization is treated only as a whole since internal economic trade and
atmospheric mixing of CO2 are very rapid compared to the multi-decadal evolution of civilization.
Further, no explicit account is made of people or their policies. Civilization is part of the physical
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universe and it is modeled as any other physical system. Long-term growth in global consumption
and emission rates are considered only as a thermodynamic response to civilization’s expansion into60
newly available energy resources.
Thus, unlike IAMs, this article does not evaluate what long-term policy actions will enable us to
limit CO2 emissions while maximizing global economic wealth. Rather, the aim is to explore the
range of future trajectories that is actually physically possible: political will can only go as far as
physical laws allow. The argument that will be presented is that, unfortunately, wealth cannot be65
decoupled from resource consumption. In fact, at least at the global scales that are relevant to CO2
emissions, it appears that “Jevons’ Paradox” does indeed apply: efficiency gains will backfire. For
this reason, it is likely that all SRES scenarios considerably overestimate the extent of economic
health that is possible for a given future atmospheric concentration of CO2. Either global warm-
ing acts as an inflationary drag on the production of wealth; or, economic growth is sustained and70
atmospheric CO2 concentrations accelerate their growth.
2 A physically consistent economic framework
An earlier article introduced a simple macroeconomic growth model that treats civilization in a man-
ner consistent with physical conservation laws (Garrett, 2011). As illustrated in Fig. 1, all material
within civilization is treated as being in local thermodynamic equilibrium with the same specific75
potential energy per unit matter; effectively, it is treated as a surface defined by constant tempera-
ture and pressure, constant density, or constant specific entropy. Accordingly, no distinction is made
between the internal components of civilization. Unlike traditional economic models, no explicit ac-
count is made for labor, capital, households, firms, governments or banks, nor the flows to and from
these components. Rather, civilization is considered only as a whole, or at a sufficiently low resolu-80
tion that the only resolved distinction is between civilization and known primary energy reservoirs
(e.g. coal, oil, uranium, etc.).
Flows to civilization can be viewed as a special case within the more general thermodynamic
model shown in Figure 1, a perspective that bears some similarities with the thermodynamic model
used by Annila and Salthe (2009) to represent economic flows. Energy reservoirs lie along a higher85
potential surface than the system of interest. The interface that separates these two surfaces is de-
fined by a fixed step in specific potential energy ∆µ (units potential energy per material unit) and
a number of material units defining the length of the interface n˘. The total potential difference that
is available to drive downward flows is the product of these two quantities, i.e., ∆G= n˘∆µ. The
flow redistributes the overall balance of potential energy towards the lower potential surface. Total90
material is conserved as required by the First Law of Thermodynamics, and the flow is downhill
as required by the Second Law of Thermodynamics. The flow represents a “heating” of the lower
potential system. The heating sustains this open system against a nearly equal dissipative flow due
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to the loss of energy to the system’s surroundings.
For civilization, the heating is equivalent to the rate a (units energy per time) at which civilization95
consumes the potential energy in primary energy resources. The flow rate of energy is proportional
to the material length of the interface n˘ through
a = α ∆G = α n˘∆µ (1)
where, α is a constant rate coefficient with units inverse time (effectively a diffusivity). This con-
sumption of potential energy is more precisely defined as a material flux. For civilization, coal and100
oil are examples of the agents that carry the potential energy we consume. However, civilization
is not made of coal and oil, but rather of raw materials such as iron and copper. Potential energy
consumption enables these raw materials to be carried downward along with the energetic flow to
add to civilization’s material bulk and sustain it against decay.
If civilization’s economic activities are part of the physical universe, then perhaps there might be a105
fiscal representation for the physical flows that sustain it. A hypothesis can be proposed that the size
of civilization is expressible thermodynamically by the potential difference ∆G driving flows, or
equivalently the heating of civilization at rate a=α∆G. Since heating sustains all of civilization’s
activities against its ultimate dissipative loss to its surroundings, the heating rate might conceivably
be what civilization intrinsically values, and therefore it might be related to a very general expression110
of civilization’s real, or inflation-adjusted economic wealth through
a ≡ λC (2)
where the rate of consumption of the potential energy in primary energy resources a (units energy
per time) is related through a constant parameter λ to a fiscal representation of global economic
wealth C (units inflation-adjusted currency). If there is no energy consumption, then civilization is115
worthless because the activities that sustain civilization’s value cannot be maintained against civ-
ilization’s energy loss through decay. Effectively civilization becomes indistinguishable from its
surroundings because the interface n˘ and the gradient ∆G shrink to zero. We eat to sustain our-
selves against radiative heat loss. If we don’t eat, eventually we die.
Here, wealth C is defined as the historical accumulation of gross world economic real produc-120
tion P (units inflation-adjusted currency per time). A comparison of this definition with more tra-
ditional approaches is presented in Section 4. Here, real production P is an instantaneous quantity
that is related to the familiar gross world product (GWP) through
GWP = P∆t (3)
where, for the sake of economic statistics, ∆t is normally equal to one year. Total economic wealth is125
distinct from production in that it is not a differential but an integral quantity (units inflation-adjusted
currency). As wealth is defined here, it is represented by the historical accumulation of production
C ≡
∫ t
0
P (t′) dt′ '
∑
i
GWP (i) (4)
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where i is an index covering the full historical record for GWP. Equivalently, economic production
is a consequence of a convergence of the material and energetic flows associated with wealth130
dC
dt
≡ P (5)
or, expressed thermodynamically, from Eqs. 1 and 2
P =
1
λ
da
dt
= ∆µ
α
λ
dn˘
dt
(6)
Effectively, economic production P is a fiscal representation of the growth rate of energy consump-
tion da/dt through an expansion of civilization’s material interface n˘ into the primary energy reser-135
voirs that it consumes. Combining Eqs. (4) and (6), global wealth arises from an accumulation of a
net material convergence over time:
C ≡ 1
λ
∫ t
0
da
dt
dt′ = ∆µ
α
λ
∫ t
0
dn˘
dt
dt′ (7)
Eqs. (1) and (2) imply a direct proportionality between wealth C, rates of primary energy con-
sumption a, and the size of the interface driving flows ∆G= n˘∆µ. In this case, there is a rate of140
return η that applies equally to each:
η ≡ d ln ∆G
dt
=
d ln n˘
dt
=
d ln a
dt
=
d ln C
dt
(8)
Positive values of η allow for exponential growth associated with interface expansion. Civilization
wealth and energy consumption are in exponential decay if the interface n˘ shrinks.
Thus, from Eqs. (5) and (8), the economic production function for this framework is145
P ≡ dC
dt
= ηC (9)
The rate of return η (units inverse time) is a time varying quantity that relates the past accumulation
of wealth C to the current production of new wealth P . Finally, by taking the time derivative of
Eq. (9), the GWP growth rate is given by
d ln P
dt
= η +
d ln η
dt
(10)150
Thus, what is normally termed as “economic growth” (i.e. dlnP/dt) is related to the sum of the
growth rate of energy consumption η and the acceleration of growth in energy consumption dlnη/dt.
The economic growth rate stalls if this acceleration stagnates.
3 Model validation
The above discussion rests on an assumed constancy of the parameter λ, as it is defined through155
Eqs. (2) and (4) by
λ ≡ a(t)∫ t
0
P (t′) dt′
' a (t)∑
i GWP (i)
(11)
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To evaluate the validity of a hypothetical constancy of λ in Eq. (11), I employed statistics for
world GWP spanning more than 2000 years (Maddison, 2003; Nations, 2010) to calculate wealth C
from Eq. (4). Values ofC were compared to nearly four decades of statistics for energy consumption160
rates a (AER, 2009).
Details are described in Appendix C of Garrett (2011). As illustrated in Table 1, the comparison
supports the hypothesis that the value of λ, as defined by Eq. (11), is indeed a constant that is in-
dependent of time: energy consumption rates a and wealth C =
∫ t
0
Pdt′ both approximately doubled
in tandem between 1970 and 2008. On a millennial scale this time interval is short, but it covers a165
tripling of GWP and more than half of total civilization growth. The full yearly time series indicates
that, during this period, λ maintained a mean value, with associated 95% confidence uncertainty in
the mean, of 9.7± 0.3 milliwatts per 1990 US dollar (Garrett, 2011).
A theoretically equivalent approach to calculating λ is to take the respective derivatives of a and
C in order to compare the inter-annual change in energy consumption rates da/dt to the real GWP170
P (Eq. 6). Derivatives of measured quantities are always more noisy than their integrals. For
example, the magnitude of dlna/dt is only about a couple of percent per year, where a itself is
subject to measurement uncertainties that, while unpublished, are plausibly of a similar magnitude.
Nonetheless, the calculated mean value of P/(da/dt) for the 1970 to 2008 period is 11.6± 4.1
milliwatts per 1990 US dollar, which is statistically consistent with the derived value for λ≡ a/C of175
9.7± 0.3 milliwatts per 1990 US dollar.
This combination of theoretical and observational support for there being a fixed relationship
between C and a is the key result supporting this study. It serves as the basis for assuming that
civilization is financially well-mixed and that wealth is derived most fundamentally from a capacity
to enable a flow of potential energy from primary energy reserves. If it is generally correct, it enables180
an enormous simplification of what is required to accurately model the global economy and its waste
products. At least at a global scale, a sophisticated IAM approach that explicitly considers people
and their lifestyles is not necessary in order to forecast future rates of energy consumption. People
do not need to be explicitly resolved in order to calculate global scale consumptive flows.
As a note, the constancy of λ should not be expected to hold at national scales. One country could185
easily be relatively wealthy compared to its current rate of energy consumption, provided that other
countries are relatively poor. The value of λ is constant only as a global quantity, where C and a
subsumes all countries that are connected through international trade.
4 Comparison with traditional economic growth models
The model presented here is unlike traditional models in several regards, but it also has key simi-190
larities (see also Appendix B in Garrett (2011)). Wealth C is analogous to the term “capital” used
in traditional economic growth frameworks in the sense that it has units of currency, rather than
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currency per unit time. However, it is much more general. As shown in Figure 1, civilization is
defined as a whole, and no distinction is made between the human and non-human elements of the
global economic system. Economic elements are not independent. Rather, all economic elements in195
civilization form a generalized capital that works in concert to consume primary energy reserves and
enable the “downhill” flows of material in a field of potential energy.
Effectively, treating civilization as a whole means that it is assumed to be internally at local ther-
modynamic equilibrium, homogeneous, or “well-mixed”. This does not mean that all economic
elements are equal in value (they are not), only that the speed of financial interactions between all200
civilization elements is sufficiently rapid compared to the timescales of global economic growth that
internal gradients can be ignored.
A consequence of treating civilization as a whole is that human labor is part of a more general ex-
pression of capitalC. Traditional economic models separate “physical” capital from labor as distinct
motive forces of economic production (Solow, 1956), sometimes including supplies of energy and205
raw materials in an appeal to thermodynamic constraints (Saunders, 2000; Warr and Ayres, 2006).
Labor, capital and energy inputs are all set to exponents that are tuned to provide agreement with
observed sectoral or national production statistics. Capital grows only due to “investments” that are
separated from household and government “consumption”. Household consumption never adds to
capital. For one, people are not normally considered to be part of capital. For another, value that is210
consumed is presumed to be gone forever, so consumption must be subtracted from production to
obtain the true capital investment.
Here, however, humans are subsumed into capital so that the production function, given by
P = ηC (Eq. 9), is determined only by the general expression of capital used here and a vari-
able rate of return η that might be analogous to the “total factor productivity” employed by Solow215
(1956). Consequently, human consumption cannot be selectively subtracted from the production of
new capital because humans are part of the whole. The component of economic production that is
traditionally termed consumption is in fact an investment in sustaining and growing humanity.
That said, physically it makes most sense to refer to consumption as something that is much
more extensive than what is directly tallied in economic accounts. In Figure 1, consumption is220
proportional to the global scale flow of primary energy resources as it passes through civilization.
This consumptive flow of matter and potential energy is downhill from high to low potential at
right angles to the constant potential surface along which civilization lies. Economic production is
proportional to the expansion of this potential surface. Thus, consumption and production cannot
be differenced because the two quantities are mathematically orthogonal. Consumption is not a225
component of production, but rather production is the convergence in thermodynamic consumption.
Only if civilization as a whole consumes more energy than it dissipates can the interface expand and
net economic value be produced.
An added advantage of subsuming labor into capital, where capital is fundamentally assumed
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to be an implicit representation of energy consumption through a≡ λC, is that, unlike traditional230
models, there is no need for any tuning of non-integer exponents in a production function. Tuning to
prior data can be a useful tool of last resort. But, it has its problems because there is little guarantee
that a model tuned to the past will not need retuning to be consistent with data in the future. While
the physical approach discussed here may be highly unorthodox by mainstream economic standards,
it does have the advantage that its absence of a tuning requirement allows it to rest on a testable,235
falsifiable hypothesis – falsifiability is one of the key hallmarks of science. Either there exists a
constant coefficient λ, or there doesn’t. Of course, as discussed above, the constancy in λ does
appear to hold. But the point is that if this constancy ever fails, then the model presented here can
be safely dismissed. Retuning is not an option.
5 Jevons’ Paradox and why efficiency gains accelerate global CO2 emission rates240
Certainly, it might seem obvious that technological advances that increase energy efficiency or en-
ergy productivity (defined as P/a) should lead to a decrease in CO2 emissions. Less energy is re-
quired to accomplish the same economic task. Even so, there is recognition among many economists
of the existence of a “rebound effect”, whereby increasing energy productivity spurs greater emis-
sions further down the road (Dimitropoulos, 2007; Herring and Roy, 2007; Sorrell, 2007). Two types245
of rebound have been identified, although in essence they both address the issue of what happens to
whatever money is saved when energy productivity goes up. The “direct” rebound effect is limited to
a particular energy service. For example, people may choose to drive more often if a vehicle is fuel
efficient, because driving is useful or pleasurable and now more affordable. There are also “indirect
rebound effects”, which extend response to differing economic sectors. Less money spent on fuel250
for efficient vehicles might enable more money to be spent on fuel for home heating.
A few studies even point to an extreme form of rebound termed “backfire”: gains in energy effi-
ciency lead ultimately to more rather than less energy consumption (Saunders, 2000; Alcott, 2005;
Owen, 2010; Alcott, 2010). First discussion of the principle came from an 1865 exposition on
energy economics by William Stanley Jevons (Jevons, 1865). Jevons was emphatic that the intro-255
duction of energy efficient steam engines had accelerated Britain’s consumption of coal. The cost of
steam-powered coal extraction became cheaper and, because coal was very useful, more attractive.
While the topic has received revived attention politically (of Lords, 2006), a general consensus on
the total magnitude of the effect has proved elusive (Sorrell, 2007). One reason is that calculating
the knock-on effects from an efficiency improvement in one sector as they propagate through the260
entire global economy is daunting if not impossible. Suppose that efficient vehicles enable added
household heating through a savings in transportation costs. Then, by raising home comfort, workers
sleep better so that they are better able to facilitate resource extraction at their companies. With
higher profits, the companies then reward the workers with raises, who in turn spend the money on
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goods produced overseas with coal-generated electricity. So, in this fashion, the ramifications of265
any given efficiency action can multiply indefinitely, spreading at a variety of rates throughout the
global economy. Barring global analysis of rebound effects over long time scales, conclusions may
be quantitative but uncertain, and dependent on the time and spatial scales considered.
An easy way to address this problem is to not resolve economic flows within the global economy,
but rather to take the more general approach shown in Fig. 1. In this case, energy efficiency is270
defined only with respect to the economic capacity of civilization, taken as a whole, to grow by doing
work on its surroundings, allowing it to expand into the reserves of primary energy that sustain it.
The amount of net or real work that civilization does to grow itself depends on a balance between
civilization’s consumptive and dissipative flows. If civilization is efficient, there is a net material
and energetic convergence that allows civilization to do net positive work to “stretch” outward its275
interface with respect to its primary energy supplies. If energy efficiency increases, this accelerates
civilization expansion, allowing civilization to consume energy at an ever faster rate.
Expressed in analytical terms, consumption of primary energy resources at rate a enables work
to be done at rate w in order to extend the material size n˘ of the interface that drives consumptive
flows. From Eq. 1, work is done at rate280
w = ∆µ
dn˘
dt
= a (12)
where =w/a is the efficiency for the conversion of heat transfer to work. Unlike the normal con-
ception, where work is done only to raise the potential of some outside agency, here work is more
self-referential. Work is done by civilization to increase the size and consumptive capacity of civi-
lization itself.285
If net work is positive, then there is exponential growth in the rate of primary energy consumption
a. Interface expansion into new energy reservoirs creates a positive feedback loop by bootstrapping
civilization into an ever more consumptive state. Combining Eqs. (1) and (12), the rate of increase
in energy consumption is related to the work done to expand the interface through
da
dt
= α ∆µ
dn˘
dt
= αw (13)290
where, as before, α is an unknown constant. Since w= a, dividing by a provides an expression for
the “rate of return” on consumption η, as defined previously in Eq. 8, that is directly proportional to
energy efficiency through
η=
1
a
da
dt
= α
w
a
=α (14)
Thus, global scale increases in the energy efficiency  lead to a higher rate of return η and accelerated295
growth of energy consumption rates a. Treated as a whole, an efficient system grows faster and
consumes more.
That said, increasing energy efficiency does translate to higher prosperity. Economic production
is related to the rate of return through P = ηC (Eq. 9), where wealthC is tied to energy consumption
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through a=λC (Eq. 2), λ being an empirically measurable constant. It follows that, at global scales,300
the energy productivity P/a is tied to energy efficiency  through
P
a
=
η
λ
=
α
λ
 (15)
The implication is that, at least for global economic systems, changes in energy efficiency and energy
productivity are equivalent. Through Eq. 10, both accelerate GWP growth even if they do not in fact
lead to a decrease in overall energy consumption, as is commonly assumed (Pacala and Socolow,305
2004; Raupach et al., 2007). At global scales, Jevons’ Paradox holds.
The analogy here might be to a growing child, who uses the material nutrients and potential energy
in food not only to produce waste but also to grow. As the child grows, it eats more food, accelerating
its growth until it reaches adulthood and growth stabilizes (in which case η' 0). A healthy, energy
efficient child will grow faster than one who is sick and inefficient. A diseased child may even die310
(in which case η < 0).
These conclusions have direct bearing on global scale emissions of CO2. Just as civilization can
be treated as being well-mixed over timescales relevant to economic growth, atmospheric concen-
trations of CO2 are also well-mixed over timescales relevant to global warming forecasts. Thus, for
the purpose of relating the economy to atmospheric CO2 concentrations, what matters is only how315
fast civilization as a whole is emitting CO2.
CO2 emissions are primarily a by-product of energy combustion. The emission rate E is deter-
mined by the product of the global rate of energy consumption a, and the carbonization of the fuel
supply defined by
c ≡ E
a
(16)320
where, E and a are measured quantities. It follows from Eq. (2) that current rates of CO2 emissions
E are fundamentally coupled to wealth C, or past economic production, through
E = λcC = λc
∫ t
0
P (t′) dt′ (17)
Drawing from statistics for CO2 emissions from the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center
(Marland et al., 2007), Table 1 shows that, like a and C, CO2 emissions E have approximately325
doubled between 1970 and 2008. Meanwhile, the value λc=E/C has stayed approximately con-
stant. Its mean value (and uncertainty in the mean) taken from the entire yearly time series is
2.42± 0.02 ppmv atmospheric equivalent CO2 per year, per thousand trillion 1990 US dollars of
global wealth.
Note that, unlike λ, the carbonization c is not a fundamental property of the economic system330
within this framework. At least in principle, it could be more variable in the future than it has been
in the recent past. Combining Eqs. (8) and (17), emission rates grow at rate that is determined by the
growth rate of wealth and the rate of change of carbonization
d ln E
dt
=
d ln C
dt
+
d ln c
dt
= η +
d ln c
dt
(18)
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The implication is that, if technological changes allow energy productivity or energy efficiency335
to increase, then the rate of return η increases and CO2 emissions accelerate. This is unless de-
carbonization is as rapid as the rate of growth of wealth η. If so, then emission rates E can
be stabilized. If, however, the carbonization c stays approximately constant, then CO2 emissions
ratesE will remain fundamentally linked to global economic wealth C through the constant value of
2.42± 0.02 ppmv of CO2 emitted per year, per thousand trillion 1990 US dollars of current wealth.340
It can only be through an economic collapse that CO2 emissions rates will decline.
6 Environmentally driven economic decay
6.1 Accounting of inflation and decay
The broadest available measure of the inflation rate is the so-called GDP deflator, which is calculated
from the year-on-year increase in the prices of a very broad basket of consumer and industrial goods.345
Effectively, the gross domestic product becomes devalued by some inflationary fraction i that makes
the “real”, inflation-adjusted GDP less than its “nominal” value. Expressed for the world as a whole
i =
nominal − real
nominal
=
ˆGWP − GWP
ˆGWP
(19)
While there have been a wide variety of theoretical explanations for what drives inflation, the field
is fluid and none have been solidly rejected (Parkin, 2008). Price inflation is traditionally viewed as a350
simple imbalance between the monetary supply and economic output, and therefore mostly a matter
for central bank control. What is less clear is why high inflation appears to have a negative effect
on inflation-adjusted economic growth (Sarel, 1996). There are also external forces that can create
the initial inflationary pressure, such as an external shock to primary energy supplies (Bernanke
et al., 1997), and even climate change, which drives up food prices through adverse effects on crop355
production (Lobell et al., 2011).
From the perspective of the model presented here, inflationary pressures can arise from either
decreasing energy availability or increasing environmental disasters. This can be assessed because
the real value or wealth of civilization is fixed to its current capacity to consume primary energy
resources through the constant coefficient λ, which has a value of 9.7±0.3 milliwatts per inflation360
adjusted 1990 dollar: in 2008, 16.4 TW of power supported 1656 trillion 1990 US dollars of civiliza-
tion worth. For interpreting inflation, this coefficient provides an anchor for assessing real economic
worth, at least for civilization as a whole.
Supposing that natural disasters destroy the capacity of life and property to consume energy,
civilization’s real value declines while plausibly keeping the availability of currency largely intact.365
Alternatively, while banks do not actively destroy civilization’s capacity to consume energy, they
might be excessively loose with currency. If so, the real currency value attached to the existing
capacity to consume energy becomes diluted by an excessive availability of new currency, while real
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wealth stays fixed. Whether banks or climate extremes initiate the action, in either case, inflation
should be expected to follow as a consequence of an introduced imbalance between real and nominal370
value. The availability of currency becomes out of proportion with the true capacity of civilization
to consume primary energy supplies.
Real, inflation-adjusted wealth has been defined here by C =
∫ t
0
Pdt′ (Eq. 2) or equivalently, the
instantaneous function dC/dt≡P (Eq. 9), where P is the inflation-adjusted production. Here, in
effect, all production is a differential addition to a generalized measure of wealth, provided it is375
adjusted for inflation. This adjustment to the nominal (non-inflation-adjusted) production of wealth
Pˆ can be expressed as a sink of existing wealth γC, where γ represents the rate at which existing
wealth is being destroyed or lost due to natural decay (Garrett, 2011)
dC
dt
≡ P = Pˆ − γC (20)
Thus, the rate of decay is simply380
γ ≡ Pˆ − P
C
=
Pˆ − P∫ t
0
Pdt′
(21)
Similarly, the rate β at which wealth C leads to nominal production Pˆ can be defined by
β ≡ Pˆ
C
=
Pˆ∫ t
0
Pdt′
(22)
In this case, from Eq. (20), the growth of wealth can be expressed as a balance between a source and
a sink of wealth385
dC
dt
= (β − γ) C (23)
This is just an alternative expression for Eq. (9) with the rate of return on wealth η replaced by the
difference between the coefficient of nominal production β and the coefficient of decay γ
η = β − γ (24)
The advantage of applying this treatment is that it leads to a very simple expression for an infla-390
tionary pressure i in Eq. (19)
i =
∫ t+∆t
t
(
Pˆ − P
)
dt′∫ t+∆t
t
Pˆ dt′
=
∫ t+∆t
t
γ Cdt′∫ t+∆t
t
β Cdt′
=
〈γ〉
〈β〉 (25)
where brackets imply a mean over the time interval of calculation ∆t, which is normally one year.
Inflation is determined by the balance between the coefficients β and γ of production and decay.1 If
1In practice, statistics for nominal and real GWP are normally provided in current and fixed-year currency, respectively,
and therefore are in different units. Thus, for a given time period ∆t (say one year), γ can be calculated from differences in
the logarithmic rate of expansion for Pˆ and P , noting that ln(1+x)'x
γ =
Pˆ − P
C
' P
C
 1
P
d
(
Pˆ − P
)
dt
 ∆t ' P
C
d ln
(
Pˆ /P
)
dt
∆t
Effectively
[
d ln
(
Pˆ /P
)
/dt
]
∆t is the fractional inflation i over period ∆t. Then, since η =P/C, it follows that γ = iη
and β = η + γ = (1+ i)η.
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∆t is one year, then the quantity i∆t represents the difference between nominal and real GWP.395
If the coefficient of decay becomes greater than the coefficient of production, such that γ >β, then
from Eq. (25), nominal production Pˆ may be positive, but real production P is negative. Discussing
negative real production would seem unusual (or impossible) from a traditional economic perspective
that is geared towards modeling growth. From the more physical framework described here, it
is simply a consequence of environmentally driven decay being so large that there are economic400
hyper-inflationary pressures associated with a rate i= γ/β that is greater than 100%. Historically,
and on more regional levels, this is in fact a fairly common scenario. From Eq. (20), dC/dt< 0, and
total wealth is in a state of collapse.
As discussed in Appendix A, hyper-inflation and collapse can be viewed thermodynamically as
an interface between civilization and its energy reserves that is shrinking inwards rather than grow-405
ing outwards. This means that the nominal work
∫ t+∆t
t
wˆ dt′ that is done to grow civilization is
overwhelmed by external work done on civilization through decay. Real or net work done to grow
civilization
∫ t+∆t
t
w dt′ turns negative and civilization enjoys no return on its energetic investment.
As a whole, civilization becomes less wealthy as it becomes less able to consume primary energy
reserves.410
A related concept is termed Energy Returned on Energy Invested (or EROI), and is becoming
increasingly popular as a metric of society’s capacity to exploit primary energy reserves for economic
benefit (Murphy and Hall, 2010). Evidence suggests that the value of EROI is declining, presumably
as new energy reserves become increasingly difficult to access. In Appendix A it is shown that a
direct link can be drawn between the EROI concept and inflation (or the GDP deflator) discussed415
here. At global scales, the value of EROI is equal to the inverse of the inflation rate.
6.2 Inflationary pressures and civilization resilience
The IPCC Working Group II (IPCC, 2007b) has identified potential societal damages due to climate
“extremes”, such as droughts and floods, and “means”, such as sea-level rise. These will exert
a negative feedback on civilization wealth such that, at some point, wealth and atmospheric CO2420
become intrinsically coupled because civilization is no longer able to consume and emit as it has in
the past.
Based on the above arguments, it is easy to see how natural disasters are often expected to be
inflationary since they represent an increase in the work done by the environment on civilization.
If the decay coefficient γ suddenly rises, then from Eq. (20), this expands the difference between425
nominal and real production. From Eq. (25), the shock leads to inflation and less capacity to consume
energy and emit CO2.
An important point here is that, for inflationary pressures to take hold, there must be an increase
not just in total damages γC, but in the coefficient of decay γ. Hurricane damages along the Atlantic
seaboard have risen over the past century, but not because of a long-term increase in hurricane430
13
intensity or frequency (i.e., γ). Rather, economic wealth C has become increasingly concentrated at
the coasts (Pielke et al., 2008).
What seems reasonable is to expect that the decay rate γ will in fact change over coming decades
due to the increasingly harmful effects of global warming. Impacts will be regionally specific, but
extremely difficult to predict. In light of this, the approach taken here is to simplify representation435
of the global economic impacts of climate change by defining a global economic “resilience” to a
logarithmic increase in atmospheric CO2 concentrations
ρ = 1/(dγ/d ln [CO2]) (26)
If civilization’s resilience is high, then the coefficient of decay γ responds weakly to logarithmically
changing CO2 levels.2440
There have been estimates of the regional societal and economic impacts from extremes in climate
(Patz et al., 2005; Leckebusch et al., 2007; Hsiang et al., 2011). Unfortunately, it is not entirely
obvious how to appropriately scale these impacts to civilization as a whole when many of the effects
of climate change will be sustained, global, and largely unprecedented. Recent statistics do not yet
provide meaningful guidance either. Figures 2 and 3 show no clear trends in the decay coefficient445
γ that can easily be attributed to accelerating climate change. Up until this point, the dominant
signature in γ is only its inter-annual variability. A recent meta-analysis of disaster losses has arrived
at a similar conclusion (Bouwer, 2011).
The hypothesis that is proposed here is that the effect on society of elevated levels of atmospheric
CO2 will be akin to a prolonged natural disaster. From the standpoint of the economic model dis-450
cussed above, the effect will be to steadily increase the coefficient of decay γ without changing the
coefficient of nominal production β. From Eq. (25), this will appear economically as an inflationary
pressure that impedes the growth in wealth C, as described by Eq. (23). In a phase space of [CO2]
and P , the trajectory of civilization will depend on the resilience ρ of civilization to elevated carbon
dioxide levels: it is our resilience that will determine the strength of climate’s negative feedback on455
economic growth.
7 The Climate and Thermodynamics Economic Response Model (CThERM)
To explore the coupling between civilization and the atmosphere, the following section introduces
a very simple framework for forecasting the evolution of civilization in a phase space of [CO2] and
P , for a variety of assumed values of resilience ρ. The Climate and Thermodynamics Economic Re-460
sponse Model (CThERM) couples a prognostic economic model to atmospheric CO2 concentrations,
as illustrated in Fig. 4. The prognostic economic module has just three coupled dynamic equations
2The logarithm of CO2 concentrations is considered because the primary insulating gases responsible for climate warming,
namely CO2 and water vapor, have a longwave absorptance that varies roughly as the square root of their concentrations (Liou,
2002).
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for wealth C, atmospheric CO2 concentrations [CO2], and the rate of return η. From Eq. (8), wealth
grows at rate
dC
dt
= ηC (27)465
The balance between anthropogenic emissions E =λcC (Eq. 17) and natural sinks is
d [CO2]
dt
= E − σ ∆ [CO2] (28)
where E =λcC (Eq. 17) and σ is an assumed linear sink rate on perturbations ∆[CO2] = [CO2]−
[CO2]0 above some preindustrial baseline. For convenience, here it is assumed that the
CO2 emissions are instantly diluted in the total atmospheric mass (Trenberth, 1981) such that470
1 ppmv atmospheric CO2 = 2.13 Pg emitted carbon. Thus c is expressed in units of ppmv atmo-
spheric CO2 emitted by civilization per Joule of energy consumption.
The modeling approach here is aimed at the simplest of possible approaches. In reality, the carbon
cycle is much more complicated than can be easily justified by a linear sink model (Cox et al., 2000;
Canadell et al., 2007). That said, even the current magnitude of the CO2 sink is not well constrained475
(Le Que´re´ et al., 2003). Given current uncertainties, assuming a linear sink that is in line with current
observations appears to provide long-range forecasts of [CO2] that are in good agreement with far
more sophisticated models. More detailed discussion is presented in Sect. 7.3 and Appendix C.
From Eqs. (24) and (26), the rate of return η changes at a rate given by
dη
dt
=
dβ
dt
− 1
ρ
d ln [CO2]
dt
(29)480
Model trajectories in wealth C and atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration evolve subject to
initial conditions in [CO2], C, β and γ. Note that global production P is a diagnostic quantity given
by Eq. (9).
The prognostic CThERM model expressed by Eqs. (27) to (29) is incomplete because it lacks
prognostic equations for the carbonization of the world’s wealth c=E/(λC) (Eq. 17) and the coef-485
ficient of nominal production β = Pˆ /C (Eq. 22). A more sophisticated model will need to address
the evolution of these terms.3
A hindcast simulation that illustrates the accuracy of the model framework is shown in Fig. 5.
The hindcast is initialized in 1985 and, based on results shown in Fig. 2, it is assumed that dγ/dt = 0
and that dβ/dt evolves on a linear trajectory that is consistent with what is observed for the period490
between 1970 and 1984. A linear fit for dβ/dt during this initialization time period is 0.017% yr−1
per year with a 95% confidence limit of ±0.01% yr−1 per year. A second source of uncertainty is
3In principle, the evolution of β is governed by two factors, as illustrated in Fig. 1. As civilization or any other system
grows, it depletes known available energy reservoirs; at the same time, it expands into new reservoirs that were previously
unavailable or unknown. Past bursts in growth in η =β−γ are seen to have occurred around 1880 and 1950, perhaps due to
a sudden increase in availability of important new oil reservoirs (Garrett, 2011). Presumably the future availability of energy
reservoirs will influence the value of c as well (Sorrell et al., 2010).
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associated with the CO2 sink coefficient σ, which is estimated to have a value of 1.55± 0.75 % yr−1
(Appendix B).
Figure 5 shows that, with these assumptions, the mid-range of hindcasts over a 23 year period495
between 1985 and 2008 faithfully reproduces both the timing and magnitude of observed changes
in atmospheric CO2 concentrations and global economic production P . The implication is that,
even though the model that is used is extremely simple, it is nonetheless able to make accurate
multi-decadal forecasts for the coupled growth of the global economy and atmospheric composition.
Furthermore, it suggests some ability of the model to explore thermodynamically constrained fore-500
casts in a space of P and [CO2] for a range of hypothetical values of civiilization resilience ρ and
decarbonization rates −d ln c/dt.
As discussed previously, there is no good guidance yet for what a suitable choice for the re-
silience ρ might be, and no prognostic model is included here for forecasting the evolution of either
carbonization c or the nominal productivity coefficient β. Thus, while the CThERM model is ther-505
modynamically constrained, it can still only provide forecasts for a range of hypothetical scenarios
in these parameters. In what follows, two main categories of scenarios are considered.
7.1 Forecast scenario A: no decarbonization
The first scenario that is considered here is simply to assume that for the remainder of this century,
there will be no further decarbonization, and that the coefficient of nominal production will remain510
stagnant ( i.e., dc/dt = 0 and dβ/dt = 0 ). Figure 6 shows examples of forecasts for these conditions
for the years between 2009 and 2100. Also shown for historical reference are past measurements
between 1 AD and 2008 (Appendix C).
For this scenario, a range of resilience sub-scenarios can be considered. If civilization is so re-
silient that it is unaffected by elevated CO2 levels, then the world economy P sustains recent growth515
rates of 2.2% per year. By 2100, it increases by nearly an order of magnitude to a value of nearly
300 trillion 1990 dollars per year. The accumulated production of wealth C ≡ ∫ 2100
0
Pdt′ corre-
sponds to an increase in rates of energy consumption a=λC from 16 TW in 2008 to 126 TW in year
2100. Absent any decarbonization, the accumulated and accelerating emissions push CO2 levels
above 1100 ppmv.520
If, however, civilization has an extremely low resilience to elevated CO2 levels, then the decay
coefficient γ increases by 5% yr−1 per CO2 doubling. Eventually, the decay coefficient exceeds the
coefficient of nominal production β. In this case, economic production shrinks due to the impacts
of climate change. Well before the year 2100, the inflationary pressure exceeds 100%: real GDP is
negative and civilization is in a phase of collapse. However, even in this scenario, energy consump-525
tion rates peak at 89 TW in 2056 and although they fall to 21 TW in year 2100, they still exceed
current levels. Because rates of energy consumption remain high, even with rapid and immediate
civilization collapse, CO2 levels still continue their rise to approximately 600 ppmv by year 2100.
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What is perhaps most striking when looking at these forecasts is that we can expect some ex-
traordinarily rapid near-term changes in the global economy and atmospheric composition. For any530
plausible resilience condition, atmospheric CO2 concentrations and civilization GWP will change
by as much in the next 40 years as they have in the past two thousand.
7.2 Forecast scenario B: rapid decarbonization
Although there is no evidence that civilization is in fact decarbonizing (Raupach et al., 2007), one
can imagine for the sake of illustration a second forecast scenario shown in Fig. 7 in which β stays535
constant, but the carbonization of civilization c drops extremely rapidly. Supposing that carboniza-
tion c halves in just 50 years, the value of c ends up 73% lower in 2100 than it is at present. This
is highly imaginary, of course. If nothing else, no consideration is made here of the costs of de-
carbonizing that would be involved. These would presumably act to lower β and be an inflationary
pressure themselves (Eq. 25). However, it is worth considering because, for one, it illustrates how540
extremely rapid decarbonization would need to be to lower CO2 concentrations to something that
only moderately exceeds the 450 ppmv levels that might be considered to be “dangerous” (Hansen
et al., 2007). If civilization’s resilience to climate change is extremely low, then only a combination
of rapid civilization collapse and high decarbonization comes close to achieving a 450 ppmv goal.
Otherwise, if civilization’s resilience to climate change is extremely high, then emissions increase545
from 3.95 ppmv equivalent per year in 2008 to 8.64 ppmv per year in 2100.
The reason why even rapid decarbonization still corresponds with increasing emissions rates is
that it has the side benefit of aiding economic health and growth. By slowing growth in CO2 con-
centrations, the worst impacts of future climate change are constrained. Energy consumption is
fundamentally linked to the size of civilization through the constant λ (Eq. 11). Thus, any improve-550
ment to economic wealth corresponds to increased energy consumption and more rapid growth in
CO2 emissions (Eq. 18).
It is counter-intuitive, but comparing two scenarios with very low resilience to climate change,
energy consumption rates rise about twice as fast with rapid decarbonization as with no decarboniza-
tion. The reason is that decarbonization aids society health by limiting global warming. Better health555
means greater energy consumption, which then leads to a partial offset of any environmental gains
that came from decarbonizing in the first place.
7.3 Comparison with SRES scenarios
Figures 6 and 7 include for comparison’s sake the phase space of P and CO2 concentrations that are
employed in several well-known IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) illustrative560
marker scenarios (IPCC, 2007a; Manning et al., 2010). These scenarios provide statistics through
2100 for global GWP in 1990 MER US dollars along with global CO2 emission rates from fossil
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fuel combustion. For the sake of consistency with CThERM calculations, atmospheric CO2 concen-
trations are calculated from the second CThERM equation given by Eq. (28). Across the scenarios,
calculated trajectories in CO2 concentration perturbations are lower than those presented in the IPCC565
Third Report for the same emission rates, but calculated using the sophisticated “Bern” carbon cycle
model (Joos et al., 1996). Part of this discrepancy may be because no consideration is made for the
small additional perturbations in anthropogenic CO2 emissions that come from future non-fossil fuel
sources. But also, no account is made for possible future saturation of CO2 sinks (Le Que´re´ et al.,
2007). Regardless, the agreement is still sufficiently favorable to support using the extremely simple570
CO2 sink model in Eq. (28) as an accessible, if conservative, substitute for the more sophisticated
approaches used by the IPCC.
The comparisons between the CThERM and SRES scenarios are grouped according to whether
or not decarbonization is included in the forecasts. CThERM trajectories in Fig. 6 include no de-
carbonization, and are paired with the A1F1 and A2 scenarios. These two SRES storylines are both575
based on a fossil-fuel reliant economy, while A1F1 has faster economic growth. For contrast, the
CTheRM trajectories in Fig. 7 do include decarbonization, and are paired with the A1T, B1 and
B2 scenarios. These storylines all include a switch to less carbon intensive fuels, but with a range of
speeds of economic development.
Regardless of the precise scenario that is considered, there is a basic difference between the580
CThERM forecasts and the SRES scenarios. Each SRES scenario greatly underestimates how much
atmospheric CO2 concentrations will rise for a given level of global GWP. Or, put another way,
SRES scenarios produce an unphysical overestimate of the wealth society can have while main-
taining CO2 levels below some nominal threshold. For example, the “environmentally sustainable”
B1 scenario suggests that a CO2 level below 500 ppmv is plausible by the end of this century, while585
maintaining a GWP of 360 Trillion 1990 US dollars per year. The CThERM results suggest that this
combination simply cannot happen because, even with rapid decarbonization, sustaining this level of
economic activity would require too much energy consumption. It is only with rapid decarbonization
and civilization collapse that such CO2 concentrations can be attained.
Perhaps the basic reason that there is a mismatch between the CThERM and SRES scenarios is590
that the SRES scenarios are based on an assumption that increases in energy efficiency will lower
the amount of CO2 emitted for a given amount of economic activity. The thermodynamic and obser-
vational analysis described here and in Garrett (2011) indicate that the opposite should be expected
to hold. From Eq. (14), gains in efficiency  accelerate CO2 emissions by accelerating civiliza-
tion’s capacity to access primary energy reservoirs. While, increasing efficiency may also lead to a595
higher GWP (Eq. 15), feedbacks in the economic system make it impossible to decouple the energy
consumption from economic well-being.
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8 Conclusions
This study builds on a key result presented in a prior article (Garrett, 2011), that civilization
wealth and global rates of primary energy consumption are tied through a constant value of600
λ= 9.7± 0.3 mW per 1990 US dollar. On this basis, a very simple prognostic model (CThERM)
is introduced for forecasting the coupled evolution of the economy and atmospheric CO2 concentra-
tions. While the model in its basic form has just three prognostic equations, it nonetheless provides
accurate multi-decadal hindcasts for global world production and atmospheric concentrations of
CO2.605
The much more sophisticated formulations commonly used in Integrated Assessment Models can
have hundreds of equations. In part this is required to forecast regional variations of specific societal
indicators such as population or standard of living. The argument made here and in Garrett (2011)
is that, at the global scales relevant to atmospheric composition, such complexity is largely unnec-
essary. Both the global economy and atmospheric CO2 can be considered to be “well-mixed”, and610
they both are constrained by the global rate of primary energy consumption.
One implication of this result is that global warming should be expected to manifest itself eco-
nomically as a growing gap between the nominal and inflation-adjusted GWP. Environmental pres-
sures erode a material interface that enables civilization to consume the primary energy resources it
requires. Normally, this erosion is more than offset by increasing access to primary energy reser-615
voirs; in fact, it is an increasing access to energy supplies that has enabled a positive (and growing)
inflation-adjusted gross world product, and has led to the generally high standard of living we enjoy
today. However, in a global warming scenario, it can be expected that environmental pressures will
increase, and these will act to slow growth in energy consumption. Fiscally, this will appear as an
inflationary drag on the growth of economic wealth. Ultimately, it is conceivable that it will push620
civilization towards an accelerating decline.
Another implication is that the commonly used IPCC SRES scenarios make unphysical underes-
timates of how much energy will be needed to be consumed, and CO2 emitted, to sustain prosperity
growth. At the globally relevant scales, energy efficiency gains accelerate rather than reduce en-
ergy consumption gains. They do this by promoting civilization health and its economic capacity to625
expand into the energy reserves that sustain it.
Reductions in CO2 emissions can be achieved decarbonizing civilization’s sources of fuel. But
this has an important caveat. Decarbonization does not slow CO2 accumulation by as much as might
be anticipated because it also alleviates the potential rise in atmospheric CO2 concentrations. If
decarbonization leads to fewer climate extremes, then economic wealth is supported, and because630
wealth is tied to energy consumption through a constant, consumptive growth partly offsets the
anticipated CO2 emission reductions. Ultimately, civilization appears to be in a double-bind with no
obvious way out. Only a combination of extremely rapid decarbonization and civilization collapse
will enable CO2 concentrations to be stabilized below the 450 ppmv level that might be considered
19
as “dangerous” (Hansen et al., 2007).635
Appendix A
Thermodynamic accounting of decay
The fiscal arguments for inflation discussed in Section 6.1 can be represented within the context of
the generalized thermodynamic framework illustrated in Fig. 1. Global wealth can be related to ther-640
modynamic flows through the constant λ, as framed by Eq. (11) and validated through observations
(Table 1). From Eq. (12), thermodynamic work w can be defined as the net growth rate in an in-
terface with potential difference ∆G and number of material units n˘. The interface drives downhill
thermodynamic flows at rate a=α∆G= n˘∆µ, where ∆µ is a fixed potential jump per unit matter.
Thus, from Eq. (8), thermodynamic work is done by civilization to expand the interface at rate645
w =
d∆G
dt
= ∆µ
dn˘
dt
(A1)
Equation (8) dictates that, since λ is a constant, the rate of return η applies equally to thermodynamic
flows a, the size of the potential difference at the interface that drives flows ∆G, and wealth C. It
follows that the thermodynamic analog for the economic growth equations given by Eqs. (20) or (23)
is650
d∆G
dt
= η∆G = wˆ − γ ∆G = (β − γ) ∆G (A2)
What this expresses is the details of how the interface shown in Figure 1 grows. Civilization grows by
doing “nominal” work to stretch the interface driving flows outward at rate wˆ =β∆G. By extension
of Eq. (6), nominal work is the thermodynamic expression of nominal economic production through
Pˆ =
α wˆ
λ
=
α
λ
β ∆G (A3)655
However, it is only the “real” portion of work w = d∆G/dt that contributes to the net or real
rate of interface growth: for real growth to occur, nominal work β∆G must be sufficiently rapid
to overcome natural decay γ∆G. Thus, real production P is related the size of the interface ∆G
through
P =
α w
λ
=
α
λ
(β − γ) ∆G (A4)660
Expressed in this fashion, real economic production is a balance between two opposing thermody-
namic forces shown in Figure 1. There is an interface that connects civilization to available energy
reservoirs. Flow across this interface arises from a consumption of primary energy resources. By
consuming energy, civilization both sustains its current size and does nominal work to “stretch” out-
ward the size of the interface at rate β. As the interface grows, it makes previously innaccessible or665
unknown reservoirs of high potential energy (such as oil, coal, uranium, etc.) newly available. It is
by consuming and doing work that consumption accelerates.
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However, this stretching only drives “nominal” growth. “Real” growth takes into account en-
vironmental pressures that erode the interface at rate γ. Such “predation” of civilization by the
environment is due to a loss of matter as things fall apart. There are many forms of material loss.670
Photons are radiated through thermal heat loss; mass falls down due to gravitation, and electrons
are redistributed due to chemical reactions. What matters from civilization’s perspective is that this
constant loss of material hinders gains from nominal work wˆ. This slows the growth of the interface
∆G= ∆µn˘ that drives flows, and consequently it dampens growth in energy consumption a and
wealth C. Due to material loss, only net or real work is done at rate w.675
Thus, from Eqs. A3 and A4, the thermodynamic form of the expression for economic inflation
given by Eq. 25 is
i =
∫ t+∆t
t
(
Pˆ − P
)
dt′∫ t+∆t
t
Pˆ dt′
=
∫ t+∆t
t
(wˆ − w) dt′∫ t+∆t
t
wˆ dt′
=
∫ t+∆t
t
γ ∆Gdt′∫ t+∆t
t
β ∆Gdt′
=
〈γ〉
〈β〉 (A5)
As a note, a direct link can be drawn here to the increasingly popular concept of Energy Returned
on Energy Invested (EROI) (Murphy and Hall, 2010). The dimensionless EROI factor expresses680
how much energy society is able to recoup for consumption, relative to the amount of energy it must
expend to access the energy. A point that is sometimes made is that the EROI is declining as new oil
reserves become increasingly difficult to discover.
Here, the real rate of doing workw is defined as the expansion in the potential gradient ∆G, where
the potential drives the flows of energy to society at rate a. Real work expands energy consumption685
at rate da/dt = αw = αd∆G/dt (Eq. 13). From Eq. A2, civilization expansion is positive if there
is a convergence of flows and the amount of potential energy that must be “expended” in an effort
to grow civilization energy consumption
∫ t+∆t
t
αγ∆G dt′ is less than the increase in the amount of
potential energy that becomes newly available to be “consumed”
∫ t+∆t
t
αβ∆G dt′. Thus, the EROI
concept is expressible thermodynamically as690
EROI =
Energy Consumption Gain
Energy Expenditure
=
∫ t+∆t
t
wˆ dt′∫ t+∆t
t
(wˆ−w) dt′
=
∫ t+∆t
t
αβ∆G dt′∫ t+∆t
t
αγ∆G dt′
=
〈β〉
〈γ〉 (A6)
Since this is just the inverse of Eq. A5, the EROI is inversely tied to inflationary pressures through
i =
1
EROI
(A7)
For example, a global EROI of 20 calculated over a given time period ∆t, corresponds to a corre-
sponding inflationary pressure of 5%. If global civilization ever gets to the point that it expends as695
much energy during the extraction process as it is able to consume in return, then the inflationary
pressure is 100%, the EROI value is unity and civilization wealth C is on the verge of tipping into
collapse. Any expansion work that civilization does serves only to maintain a standstill.
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Appendix A
700
Parameterization of a linear sink term for CO2
A portion of the anthropogenic CO2 that is accumulating in the atmosphere has a concurrent sink to
the land and oceans, both from natural processes and changes associated with land-use. The nature
of the sink is complex, and depends on multiple processes with timescales that vary by orders of
magnitude. Detailed assessments of the magnitude, trends, and uncertainties in the airborne fraction705
of CO2 emissionsE are provided by Canadell et al. (2007), and ideally would require a fully coupled
Earth System Model (Gent and Co-authors, 2009).
For the sake of simplicity of argument, the carbon dioxide sink is assumed here to be a linear
function of the disequilibrium in atmospheric CO2 concentrations C. To see why this might not
be as terrible a choice as it might initially appear, consider the simple analytic representation of a710
detailed carbon cycle model (Joos et al., 1996), which shows that a small pulse of CO2 into the
atmosphere decays over multiple timescales (Hansen et al., 2007):
CO2 (%) = 18 + 14 e
−t/420 + 18 e−t/70 + 24 e−t/21 + 26 e−t/3.4 (A1)
This formulation points to multiple sink coefficients with decay weighted towards shorter timescales,
meaning that recent, faster emissions decay at a more rapid rate than older, slower contributions.715
Thus, super-exponential (i.e. the exponent of an exponent) emissions growth would progressively
bias the instantaneous, or effective, value of the sink rate to ever shorter timescales. If, however,
CO2 emissions grow nearly at a logarithmically constant rate, then the linear sink rate for these CO2
emissions σ (Eq. 28) should be approximately constant with time.
Currently, CO2 emissions growth is nearly exponential, so assuming that σ is nearly constant, its720
value can be estimated by combining data for the ocean and land sink (Le Que´re´ et al., 2003) with
an assumed pre-industrial equilibirum concentration of 275 ppmv (Wigley, 1983). This leads to an
approximate value for σ of 1.55± 0.75% per annum, corresponding to a sink timescale of about
65 years (Table A1).
The above framework neglects changes in CO2 sinks that might be expected to change in the future725
if, for example, there is saturation of the ability of the earth’s ecosystems and oceans to uptake carbon
(Cox et al., 2000; Le Que´re´ et al., 2007). Certainly the systems involved are complex and this adds
to the difficultly of making confident quantification of future behavior. Simply estimating a constant
linear sink coefficient for atmospheric CO2 based on recent observations is aimed more at simplicity
than accuracy, and certainly more sophisticated forecasts than presented here could implement some730
functional dependence for σ([∆CO2]). However, given that there are such large uncertainties on
even the current magnitude of the CO2 sink, assuming a linear sink coefficient seems adequate until
estimates of carbon fluxes can be further constrained.
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Appendix B
735
Historical records of economic production and CO2 concentrations
Historical measurements of atmospheric CO2 perturbations from an assumed baseline of 275 ppmv
are shown in Fig. A1. Measurements come from a combination of in-situ measurements from Mauna
Loa (Keeling and Whorf, 2005), and Antarctic ice core data from the EPICA Dome C (Flu¨ckiger
et al., 2002) and the Law Dome (Etheridge et al., 1996). These data are compared to a time series740
for measurements of global world production that is derived from a combination of statistics in 1990
market exchange rate dollars available since 1970 (Nations, 2010) and more intermittent, long-term
historical estimates for the years 0 to 1992 derived by (Maddison, 2003). For details see Garrett
(2011). Although it is unclear exactly why, the two millennia data in production P and and [∆CO2]
are well-represented by a remarkably simple power-law fit that accounts for 90% of the variance745
(r = 0.952)
[∆CO2] = 2.5 P
0.61
The results suggest a fairly long term anthropogenic influence on atmospheric composition. It might
be tempting to infer from these data that CO2 measurements at Mauna Loa could be used to gauge the
size of the global economy. However, obviously the observed relationship between [∆CO2] and P750
must break down sometime in the future. P is an instantaneous quantity, whereas CO2 perturbations
decay over timescales of hundreds to thousands of years (Eq. A1).
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Table 1. Measured values for the global rate of energy consumption a (TW), global wealth C (trillion
1990 US $), CO2 emissions rates E (ppmv atmospheric equivalent yr−1), the hypothesized constant parame-
ter λ (mW per 1990 US $) and λc (ppmv yr−1 per 1015 1990 US $) where c=E/a.
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008
a (TW) 7.2 8.4 9.6 10.3 11.7 12.2 13.2 15.3 16.4
C =
∫ t
0
P (t′)dt′ 821 884 960 1048 1151 1266 1398 1536 1656
λ= a/C 8.8 9.4 10.0 9.8 10.2 9.6 9.4 9.9 9.9
E 1.91 2.17 2.50 2.56 2.88 2.99 3.16 3.74 4.00
λc=E/C 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.4
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Table A1. Estimates of the annual ocean and land net sink for carbon (in Pg C yr−1), including those associated
with land-use changes (Le Que´re´ et al., 2003), the total sink (in ppmv CO2 yr−1), the decadal mean value of the
carbon dioxide disequilibrium above 275 ppmv [∆CO2], and the associated linear sink coefficient σ (% yr−1).
For convenience, the total sink is expressed in units of ppmv atmospheric CO2 per year through division by the
total atmospheric mass (Trenberth, 1981), such that 1 ppmv CO2 = 2.13 Pg emitted carbon.
Ocean sink Land sink Total sink [∆CO2] σ (% yr−1)
(in ppmv CO2 yr−1)
1980s 1.8± 0.8 0.3± 0.9 1± 0.6 70 1.4± 0.9
1990s 1.9± 0.7 1.2± 0.8 1.5± 0.5 85 1.7± 0.6
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Fig. 1. Schematic for the thermodynamic evolution of an open system, and its hypothesized economic rep-
resentation. Energy reservoirs, civilization, and its surroundings lie along distinct constant potential surfaces.
The number of material units n˘ defining an interface between civilization and energy reservoirs determines the
speed of downhill energetic flow at rate a, in proportion to a fixed specific potential difference ∆µ and rate
coefficient α. The interface itself grows or shrinks at rate w due to a net flux convergence into civilization. In a
positive feedback, interface growth at rate dn˘/dt expands energetic flows a by extending civilization’s access to
previously inaccessible energy reservoirs at rate da/dt. Fiscally, wealth C is proportional to both the interface
size n˘ and the rate of primary energy consumption a. The GWP P represents the net expansion of wealth at
rate dC/dt due to interface growth. C and a are linked through a constant λ. See the text and Garrett (2011)
for details.
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Fig. 2. From global economic statistics (Nations, 2010), derived global values for global inflation i (Eq. 25),
the decay coefficient γ (Eq. 21), the source coefficient β (Eq. 22) and the rate of return η (Eq. 24) based on
observations of nominal and real production, and total global wealth.
30
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Year
 
 
!C
"C
P = #C = (" − !)C
Fig. 3. As for Fig. 2 but for the product of the rate coefficients and total wealth C (Eq. 4). The difference
between βC and ηC is the inflationary depreciation associated with each year γC. (Eqs. 20 and 24).
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Fig. 4. Schematic illustrating the CThERM framework for economic growth (Garrett, 2011), coupled to at-
mospheric CO2 concentrations. Global rates of primary energy consumption rates a are tied to accumulated
inflation-adjusted global economic wealth C =
∫ t
0
Pdt′ through a constant coefficient λ= 9.7 milliwatts per
1990 dollar. Because λ is a constant, growth in energy consumption rates da/dt are represented economically
by the real, inflation-adjusted global GDP P . Thus, da/dt =λP determines the “rate of return” η = dlnη/dt
adding to a=λC. E represents the anthropogenic rate of CO2 emissions, β is the source for a positive rate
of return η due to increasing availability of energy reservoirs. γ is the sink for civilization growth driven by
environmental degradation. Emissions E determine CO2 concentrations, subject to land and ocean sinks. CO2
concentrations act as a negative feedback on economic growth.
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Fig. 5. Based on the CThERM model given by Eqs. (27) to (29), hindcast trajectories and associated uncertainty
estimates for the period 1985 to 2008 in a space of atmospheric CO2 concentrations (red) and global economic
production (blue). Observed statistics for the period 1970 to 2008 are shown by black dashed lines. The
model is initialized with observed conditions in 1985, and a linear trend in the nominal production coefficient
β between 1970 and 1984.
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Fig. 6. As for Fig. 5, except for CThERM trajectories calculated out to 2100, with the model initialized with
conditions in 2008 and assuming that dβ/dt = 0 and dc/dt = 0 for a range of values of inverse resilience 1/ρ (blue
numbers expressed in % yr−1 change in the decay coefficient γ per CO2 doubling). Small numbers in black
correspond to the calculated inflationary pressure i= γ/β (Eq. 25) in year 2100. Green dashed lines represent
the modeled year. Shown for comparison are the IPCC SRES A1F1 and A2 scenarios based on the CThERM
linear sink model for CO2. CO2 concentrations for these scenarios using the Bern carbon cycle model are
shown by blue diamonds. Historical data from 1 AD to 2008 is added for reference (see Appendix C).
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Fig. 7. As for Fig. 6 except that it is assumed that the value of carbonization c has an assumed halving time of
50 years. For comparison, the IPCC SRES trajectories that are considered are the A1T, B1 and B2 scenarios.
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Fig. A1. Measured perturbations in atmospheric CO2 concentrations from a baseline of 275 ppmv, compared
with historical estimates of global GDP in inflation adjusted 1990 dollars, with associated year markers, and a
linear fit to the data.
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